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Summary 
Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually 
very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate 
policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links 
uncertainty about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability analysis of 
coalitions in a stochastic, empirical setting. We show that the concept of Stability 
Likelihood improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analysis. Our 
numerical application is based on a modified version of the climate model STACO. It 
turns out that the only non-trivial coalition structure with a relatively high Stability 
Likelihood (around 25 percent) is a coalition between the European Union and Japan, 
though quantitative results depend especially on the variance in regional benefits from 
abatement. 
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There are many obstacles that prevent the formation of effective international 
environmental agreements (IEAs) as well as high participation. Two of the most 
important obstacles are free-riding and uncertainty.  
First, IEAs aim at providing a public good and therefore most countries face strong free-
rider incentives. Typically, for each region it is more profitable if other regions 
cooperate, while own abatement activities are kept at a low level. How free-riding 
undermines successful formation of IEAs has been studied extensively using game 
theoretical models, as in Hoel (1992), Cararro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) 
and also in empirical climate models such as Botteon and Carraro (1997, 1998), Tol 
(2001), Bosello et al. (2003), Eyckmans and Finus (2005), and Finus et al. (2005). A 
main conclusion of this literature is that stable coalitions improve only marginally upon 
the non-cooperative outcome because either stable coalitions are small or the abatement 
level that can be sustained in larger coalitions is very low. However, regardless of the 
specific model, all of these papers determine stable coalitions in a deterministic setting.  
Second, the uncertainties surrounding the future impacts of climate change are large, 
complicating the formation of an agreement of joint action. In particular, the benefits 
from abatement that arise in the distant future are highly uncertain, but also abatement 
costs are not fully known. These issues are highlighted in Roughgarden and Schneider 
(1999), Tol (2002) and Tol (2005). This implies that decisions on climate strategies 
must be made without full knowledge of their impacts. However, regardless of how 
uncertainty is captured in these papers and what this means for optimal abatement 
strategies, success can only be evaluated if free-rider incentives are also included in the 
analysis. 
The novel contribution of our paper is that it brings both strands in the literature 
together. It illustrates a methodology to calculate the stability of all possible coalition 
structures in a stochastic, empirical setting. Our concept of Stability Likelihood (SL) 
determines the likelihood that a coalition structure is stable, taking into account the 
uncertainty of the model parameters. That is, we model uncertainty via probability 
functions on parameter values and therefore can directly evaluate the robustness of 
results and the validity of qualitative conclusions. This contrasts with deterministic 
coalition models that can only compute whether a coalition is stable or not. This is often 
not innocuous for at least two reasons. First, in a deterministic setting coalitions are 
either stable or unstable, even though differences in payoff between equilibrium and 
deviation strategies are very small. Small changes in parameter values, which are not 
accurately known, can invalidate the conclusions. Second, uncertainty in parameter 
values is only indirectly accounted using sensitivity analyses, where each analysis is 
itself subject to the first problem.  
  2We apply the SL-concept to a two-stage cartel formation game that has been widely 
used in the literature (cf. Finus et al., 2005). In the first stage, countries decide whether 
to participate in an IEA for reducing greenhouse gases and in the second stage they 
choose their abatement strategies. Generally, there can be uncertainty in both stages. 
More precisely, when (i) deciding on participation there can be uncertainty regarding 
climate impacts and abatement costs; and (ii) hence also about other players’ 
participation strategies; and when (iii) choosing the abatement level there can be 
uncertainty regarding climate impacts and abatement costs. We consider the first option. 
This means that countries face uncertainty regarding the parameter values of the benefit 
and cost functions when deciding on participation, but choose their optimal abatement 
level after learning the “true” values in the second stage. The stability likelihood (SL) 
concept therefore identifies the probability that regions took the correct participation 
decision. We leave the last two options for further research that may make use of results 
obtained for instance in Ulph and Maddison (1997), Na and Shin (1998), Ulph (2004), 
Baker (2004) and Kolstad (2005). 
In Section 2, we present our model of coalition formation and introduce the concept of 
stability likelihood. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model, including the 
distribution functions used for the uncertain model parameters. Section 4 presents and 
discusses result of our stability analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   The model of coalition formation 
Consider a set of N heterogeneous players, each representing a region of the world. In 
the first stage, regions decide whether to become a member of an international 
agreement (IEA) or to remain an outsider. Announcement  1 i c =  means “Region i joins 
the coalition” and announcement  0 i c =  “Region i remains an outsider”; a coalition 
structure c is described by announcement vector c=(c1, …, cN). The set of players that 
announce 1 are coalition members and is denoted as  { } 1, 1,...,N i ki c i == ∀ = .  
In the second stage, regions choose their abatement levels. This leads to abatement 
vector  . The payoff of an individual region i,  1N ( ,..., ) qq q = (, b ) i q π  depends on 
abatement vector   (and hence on the strategy of all regions, due to the public good 
nature of abatement) and on a vector of model parameters b.  
q
We solve the game backwards assuming that strategies in each stage must form a Nash 
equilibrium. For the second stage, this entails that abatement strategies form a Nash 
equilibrium between coalition k and the remaining non-signatories. That is,  
[1]     
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  3where   is the abatement strategy vector of coalition k,  k q k q−  the vector of all regions 
not belonging to k,   the strategy of non-signatory i, and  i q i q−  the strategy vector of all 
other non-signatories except i. An asterisk denotes equilibrium strategies. 
Computationally, this implies that non-signatories (ik ∉ ) that announced   will 
choose their abatement strategies so as to maximize their individual payoff 
0 i c =
(, b ) i q π , 
whereas all signatories ( ) that announced  ik ∈ 1 i c =  jointly maximize the aggregate 
payoff of their coalition  (, b ) i ik q π ∈ ∑ , taking the abatement strategies of all other 
regions as given. Strategically, this means that the behaviour of non-signatories towards 
all other regions is selfish and non-cooperative; signatories behavior is cooperative 
towards their fellow members, but non-cooperative towards outsiders. Economically, 
this means strategies are group (but not globally) efficient within coalition k. Hence, the 
equilibrium economic strategy vector   corresponds to the classical “social or global 
optimum” if coalition k comprises all countries, i.e. the grand coalition forms, and 
corresponds to the classical “Nash equilibrium” if coalition k comprises only one 
member or is empty. Thus, any inefficiency stems from the fact that k is not the grand 
coalition. 
* q
Since in the context of our empirical model the equilibrium abatement vector   is 
unique for every coalition structure c and a given set of parameters b (see the proof in 
Olieman and Hendrix 2004), we can construct a vector of optimal payoffs for every 
coalition structure c,  .  
* q
* (, b ) ( , b ) ii vc q π ≡
We now turn to the first stage. Also in the first stage, strategies form a Nash 
equilibrium. That is, no signatory that announced  1 i c =  should have an incentive to 
change its announcement to 
' 0 i c =  (internal stability) and no non-signatory that 
announced   should want to announce  0 i c =
' 1 i c =  instead (external stability). For our 
purposes, this condition can be summarized compactly by the payoff stability indicator 
function  (,) f cb, which assigns the value 1 to a stable announcement vector (i.e. stable 
coalition) and the value 0 to an unstable announcement vector (i.e. unstable coalition): 
[2]   
'' 1 if  ( ( ,b) ( ,b) 0) for all  1 and for all  1,..,N
(, b )
0e l s e
ii vc vc c c i
fc
⎧ −≥ − = = ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 
The function  (, b ) f c  will take on the value 1 if for all regions the payoff for 
announcement   is higher than, or equal to, the payoff associated with alternative 
announcements  . These alternatives are constructed by changing the announcement of 
c
' c
  4one player at a time: 
' 1 cc −=  is only true if the vector   differs from vector   in one 
element.  
' c c
In a deterministic model parameter b may be based on estimation but is treated as given. 
In contrast, we construct a stochastic model by replacing the deterministic parameter b 
with stochastic variable   which is characterised by probability space ()  and 
probability density function 
b B, ,Pr B
( ) gb. Consequently, function  ( ) , f c b  becomes a 
Bernoulli variable, meaning that we can assign a likelihood to the event that  () ,1 fc = b . 
The stability likelihood of coalition structure c is defined as SL= () { } Pr , 1 fc = b  which 
equals  ()
B
,( ) d f cb gb b ⋅ ∫ . Assuming that  (.) f  is a correct representation of reality, we 
can interpret SL as the probability that coalition structure c can be claimed stable.  
Given the complexities of the model, we cannot find an analytical solution for SL, and 
therefore resort to numerical calculations. The stability likelihood is calculated using a 
Monte Carlo sampling technique: we generate M samples  m b  from  ; based on these 
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A more detailed discussion of the stability likelihood concept and computation methods 
can be found in Olieman and Hendrix (2004). 
 
3.   Calibration of the model 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
In this section, the calibration of the empirical model, called STACO (STAbility of 
Coalitions) is described. For more detailed information on the model and calibration 
procedure, see Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2005). The model comprises 
benefit and cost functions for twelve world regions: USA (USA), Japan (JPN), 
European Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries 
(EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), 
India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and "rest of the world" 
(ROW). The philosophy behind the construction of the model comprises two items. 
First, the model must be simple enough to allow for sufficient samples to be calculated 
  5within reasonable time
1. Second, the model should still reflect important results and 
features of integrated assessment models in terms of overall magnitudes of global 
emissions and concentration, abatement costs from regional abatement and benefits 
from global abatement over some time period. Therefore, the model focuses on carbon 
dioxide, but the exogenous level of other greenhouse gases is included in the calibration 
of the benefit function (cf. Nordhaus, 1994). The analysis calculates the net present 
value of a stream of net benefits starting in 2010 and covering a time period of 100 
years in order to capture the long-run effects of global warming. We model a one-shot 
cartel game and analyse only single deviations. The model is a simple version of an 
integrated assessment model and hence results should only be interpreted as a numerical 
example. Nonetheless, we believe that our numerical example illustrates the usefulness 
of SL as an indicator, as we include the best available information on the probability 
density functions of the model parameters. 
 
3.2.   Elements of the empirical model 
The payoff function of region i is given by: 
[3a]   
1
(1 ) ( ( ) ( ))
T
t
i it t it it
t




where T denotes the time horizon, t=2011,...,2110; r is the discount rate;   are benefits 
from global abatement ( ); and 
it B
N
1 ti i q
= =∑ t q it AC  are abatement costs from individual 
abatement  .  it q
The payoff function is calculated as the net present value of a stream of net benefits 
from abatement between 2010 and 2110 and thus reflects discounted avoided damages 
minus discounted abatement costs. Regional abatement costs are a function of the level 
of individual abatement by region i, while regional benefits depend on global abatement 
efforts.  
Assuming stationary abatement strategies ( 100 it i qq = ), benefits in year t can be 
expressed as a function of global abatement over the entire period. Furthermore, we 
consider that the stock of CO2 can be approximated by a linear function of emissions 
and that damages are linear in the stock of CO2.
2 It follows that annual benefits from 
reduced emissions are also linear in the level of abatement: 
                                                 
1 We need around 40,000 samples to get sufficient accuracy in the estimate of SL. This implies around 2 billion 
calculations of optimal regional abatement and payoff levels (40,000 times 12 regions times 4096 possible 
coalitions). 
2 The details of this approximation are given in Dellink et al. (2004). 
  6[4a]  () tt B qq ϕ =⋅  
where  t ϕ  denotes marginal benefits in period t from total abatement over the entire 
period. This parameter also includes the effects of limited retention of GHGs in the 
atmosphere and decay of the stock of GHGs over time. As abatement in period t will 
lead to benefits in all periods from t onwards, these marginal benefits are time-
dependent.  
Discounted total benefits,  , are then expressed as   () TB q
[4b]  () TB q q γ =⋅ 
where  γ represents discounted marginal benefits in $/ton carbon equivalents and is 










=+ ⋅ ∑ .  
Regional benefits are assumed to be a share of global benefits from abatement:  
[4c]  () () ii i T B qs T B qs q γ =⋅ =⋅ ⋅ 
where   is the share of total benefits for region i.   i s
For the specification of the abatement cost function, estimates of the EPPA model are 
used (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998). They assume an annual abatement cost function for 
region i of the following form: 
[5a]  () () ()
32 11
32 it it i it i it ACq q q αβ =⋅ ⋅ +⋅ ⋅  
For the total abatement costs of region i,   the same functional form is used, 
summed over the entire time horizon. Assuming stationary strategies and a constant 
discount rate, as in the case of benefits, the total abatement cost function becomes 
() ii TAC q
[5b]  () () ()
32 11










=+ ∑  
Taken together, the payoff function can be written as: 
[3b]  () ( ) ii i TB q TAC qi π =− .  
Generally, all model parameters are uncertain. However, we have insufficient 
information to fully estimate the probability density functions of all parameters at a 
regional level. A more advanced meta-analysis of published and unpublished estimates 
would require a study of its own and therefore is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Hence, we consider only uncertainty in the benefit and cost parameters γ ,  ,  i s i α  and 
  7i β . Other parameters such as emissions in 2010, the decay rate of greenhouse gases and 
the discount rate are assumed known with certainty. Calibration of emissions and 
concentrations is based on the widely known DICE-model by Nordhaus (1994). The 
discount rate r is set at 2% per year.  
 
3.3.   Global Benefit Function 
The distribution function for the global level of benefits (γ ) is based on a recent study 
by Tol (2005). The probability density function for peer-reviewed studies as presented 
by Tol can be closely mimicked by a 2-sided exponential function. This function is 
described by four pieces of information: (i) the 5 percentile point; (ii) the value where 
the two sides of the exponential function are separated (assuming this is above the 5 
percentile point); (iii) the cumulative probability density at this separation value; and 
(iv) the 95 percentile point (assuming this is above the separation value). The first piece 
of information is given by the value that corresponds to a cumulative probability of 5%; 
this value equals -9 $/ton, implying a strictly positive probability that benefits from 
abatement are negative. The point of separation between both sides of the function is 
given by the mode and equals 5 $/ton; the associated cumulative probability density is 
13%. Finally, the point on the right side of the function is given by the 95% cumulative 
probability density and equals 245 $/ton. These numbers are summarised in Table 1 and 
the corresponding histogram of all drawn samples is shown in Appendix I.
3 This 
distribution function implies that there is a probability of around 9 percent that the 
benefits of abatement are zero or negative; if this is the case, the optimal abatement 
quantities are zero, and regions are indifferent to cooperation. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the 2-sided exponential distribution function for the global 
benefit function (γ). 
   Value 
  5% density  -9 $/ton 
 mode  5  $/ton 
  density at mode  13% 
 95%  density  245  $/ton 
 
3.4.   Regional Benefit Shares 
The distribution function for the regional benefit shares ( ) is based on insights from a 
study by Tol (2002), though this source does not provide sufficient information on the 
i s
                                                 
3 Note that the mean value of this function (77 $/ton) differs from the value (37 $/ton) used in Finus et al. (2005). 
  8functional form of the distribution function of these shares. We opt for a gamma 
distribution that can handle the lower bound of the shares such that no region receives a 
negative share of the benefits. Moreover, as the shares can vary between zero and one 
and the mean value is typically close to zero, the distribution function should be 
skewed, as is the case for a gamma distribution. As the choice for a gamma distribution 
function may to some extent seem arbitrary, we will subject it to a sensitivity analysis in 
section 4.3.  
The mean values used for the regional shares are the values reported in the deterministic 
setting of the STACO model, which are in turn based on Fankhauser (1995) and Tol 
(1997). Standard deviations are based on expert judgement, using in particular Tol 
(2002). Typically, standard deviations are of the same order of magnitude as mean 
values, and are lower for OECD countries than for the other regions. The regional 
numbers are represented in Table 2; for a better understanding, the corresponding 
histograms for the USA and China are shown in Appendix I. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the gamma distribution function for the share parameters in 
the benefit function ( ).  i s
Region  Lower bound  Mean  Standard deviation 
USA 0  0.2263  0.1414 
JPN 0  0.1725  0.1078 
EEC 0  0.2360  0.1475 
OOE 0  0.0345  0.0216 
EET 0  0.0130  0.013 
FSU 0  0.0675  0.0675 
EEX 0  0.0300  0.0300 
CHN 0  0.0620  0.0620 
IND 0  0.0500  0.1000 
DAE 0  0.0249  0.0498 
BRA 0  0.0153  0.0306 
ROW 0  0.0680  0.1360 
 
After the samples of the regional shares are drawn, all shares are scaled up or down to 
force the sum of shares to unity. This implies that the regional shares do not strictly 
follow the gamma distribution and the resulting variance in the shares is smaller than in 
  9the original gamma distribution.
4 Though rescaling is not a necessary condition for the 
working of the model, the restriction on the sum of shares is enforced to avoid an 
impact of variations in this parameter on global benefit levels. The consequences of this 
specification will be investigated in a sensitivity analysis in section 4.3.  
 
3.5.   Abatement Cost Functions 
The regional abatement cost function contains two parameters ( i α  and  i β ), which 
cannot be assumed to be independent. Typically, empirical studies report only variations 
in the marginal abatement costs without providing information on how the slope and 
curvature of the MAC function vary. Therefore, we assume the functional form of the 
abatement cost curves to be given, and vary the level of marginal abatement costs per 
region in the simulations. This implies that both parameters in the abatement cost 
functions move simultaneously and in the same direction. 
Table 3. Characteristics of the normal distribution for the parameters in the abatement 
cost function ( i α  and  i β ). 
 
i α    
i β  
Region  Mean St.  dev.   Mean St.  dev. 
USA  0.00050  0.00006  0.00398  0.00050 
JPN  0.01550  0.00194  0.18160  0.02270 
EEC  0.00240  0.00030  0.01503  0.00188 
OOE  0.00830  0.00104  0.00000  0.00000 
EET  0.00790  0.00198  0.00486  0.00122 
FSU  0.00230  0.00058  0.00042  0.00011 
EEX  0.00320  0.00080  0.03029  0.00757 
CHN  0.00007  0.00002  0.00239  0.00060 
IND  0.00150  0.00038  0.00787  0.00197 
DAE  0.00470  0.00118  0.03774  0.00944 
BRA  0.56120  0.14030  0.84974  0.21244 
ROW  0.00210  0.00053  0.00805  0.00201 
 
                                                 
4 More information on the impact of this rescaling on the probability density function can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
  10We assume a normal distribution function; the mean is based on the deterministic 
version of the STACO model, which is in turn based on Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
The normal distribution is chosen as there seems no reason to assume a skewed 
distribution. The standard deviation for the abatement cost parameters are based on 
information in the IPCC report of 2001 (Metz et al., 2001). Due to lack of regional 
information, the standard deviation is calibrated to 12.5 percent of the mean for OECD 
regions and 25 percent for non-OECD regions. Hence, the variation in abatement costs 
is typically much smaller than the variation in benefits for most regions. The key inputs 
for the normal distribution are shown in Table 3 and for USA and China the 
corresponding probability density functions are illustrated in Appendix I. 
 
4.   Results 
Using the confidence intervals and distribution functions described above, we calculate 
the Stability Likelihood (SL) of all 4096 possible coalition structures. The results of this 
simulation are reported and discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 investigates an 
alternative scenario with lower probability of extreme observations for the benefits from 
abatement, by adoption much stricter bounds on the distribution function of the global 
benefit parameter. These stricter bounds are chosen such that the mean value of global 
benefits coincides with the deterministic value for global benefits used in Finus et al. 
(2005), thereby allowing a direct comparison between the deterministic and stochastic 
settings. Section 4.3 briefly discusses the results of some sensitivity analyses on the 
uncertainty of the various parameters and the associated distribution functions. All 
simulations are carried out with a confidence interval of 95% on the second digit of SL 
( 0.0025 SL σ = ). 
4.1.   Results for the base specification 
Table 4 presents the main results for those coalition structures that have the highest SL 
and for the Grand Coalition.  
Note that the stability of the All-Singletons structure is not uniquely defined. If all 
regions announce  , then SL=1 by definition. However, if all regions announce 
 except one, then SL may be lower, because external stability is no longer 
automatically guaranteed. In this case, the highest SL is obtained if JPN announces 
 and all other regions   with SL=0.40. That is, the likelihood that none of the 
other regions wishes to join JPN is 40%. In the All-Singletons structure abatement 
efforts amount to only 70 Gton per century, or an annual abatement of 5.8 percent of 
global emissions in 2010. This leads to a discounted payoff of almost 8.8 trillion US$ 
over the century.  
0 i c =
0 i c =
1 i c = 0 i c =













All-Singletons Undefined  undefined  69.4  5.8%  8775 
JPN,EEC 0.24 0.15  74.5 6.2% 9251 
USA,JPN 0.15 0.06  79.1  6.6% 9663 
USA,EEC 0.14 0.05  84.7  7.1% 10090 
JPN,BRA 0.12 0.02  69.7  5.8% 8824 
JPN,ROW 0.11  0.02  76.7  6.4%  9613 
EEC,ROW 0.11  0.01  79.2  6.6%  9835 
JPN,IND 0.10  0.01 78.0 6.5% 9773 
JPN,FSU 0.10  0.01 75.8 6.3% 9475 
EEC,BRA 0.10  0.01  70.1  5.9%  8857 
EEC,FSU 0.10 0.01  78.4  6.6% 9699 
Grand coal.  0.09  0  326.3  27.3%  27360 
 
The Grand Coalition would lead to much larger abatement efforts and a higher global 
payoff than no cooperation, as the gains of cooperation are fully reaped. However, the 
Grand Coalition has a low SL. In fact, the Grand Coalition is only stable when there are 
no benefits to be reaped from abatement, i.e., when the global benefit parameter is zero 
or negative. In such cases, the optimal abatement level is zero, and regions are 
indifferent to cooperation. In the calculation of SL, this is interpreted as stable. 
Therefore, Table 4 also reports “Strict SL”, which equals SL minus the probability that 
regions are indifferent to cooperation (“probability of indifference”).  
Only a few non-trivial coalition structures have a positive strict SL. All these coalition 
structures are small and improve only little over the All-Singletons structure. This 
shows the important information the SL-concept provides that cannot be obtained in a 
deterministic setting. For instance, in the deterministic STACO model analysed in Finus 
et al. (2005), no stable non-trivial coalition could be found for the base parameter 
values. Only if the global benefit parameter is raised by 20 percent a coalition of Japan 
and European Union turns out to be stable. In the stochastic setting, we obtain the 
probability that this coalition structure is stable, given the uncertainty of the benefit and 
abatement cost parameters: in 24 percent of the samples this coalition structure turns out 
to be stable (15 percent if the stability condition is strict). 
  12The regional results for the coalition of Japan and European Union are given in Table 5. 
Though the standard deviations of the abatement levels are rather big, there is a 
probability of more than 90% that abatement levels are strictly positive, implying that 
the implicit distribution function for abatement levels is right-skewed. Though they are 
not part of the coalition, the largest abatement efforts are carried out by China and the 
USA. These regions have strong incentives to unilaterally reduce their emissions 
because of relatively low marginal abatement costs compared to their marginal 
benefits.
5 For Japan and the European Union, marginal abatement costs are equal to the 
sum of marginal benefits of this coalition, reflecting the first order condition implied by 
the assumption of joint welfare maximisation of coalitions as explained in section 2.
6 
Table 5. Regional results for coalition JPN and EEC. 












Region Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Mean Mean  Standard 
deviation
Mean Mean  Mean 
USA 20.31  16.01  8.4%  2050  4313  17.6  17.3 -247 
JPN 2.83  2.68  5.1%  1650  3525  31.7  13.3  -79 
EEC 12.29  9.15 8.8%  2043  4213  31.7  17.9 -12 
OOE 2.30  1.71 3.7%  369  817  2.9  2.8 -127 
EET 1.14  1.20  2.2%  141  406  1.1  1.1  -145 
FSU 5.64  5.11  5.6%  670  1712  5.4  5.3  -221 
EEX 1.40  2.01  1.2%  312  850  2.5  2.4 -206 
CHN 21.02  24.19 8.9% 611  1739  4.9 4.8 -1282 
IND 3.30  5.59  5.2%  441  1647  3.6  3.5  -289 
DAE 0.81  1.80 2.0%  245  1008  1.9  1.9 -167 
BRA 0.03  0.08 0.2%  151  636  1.2  1.2  -11 
ROW 3.42  5.54 4.9% 568  2117  4.7  4.6  -227 
 
                                                 
5 This is in line with the arguments put forward by the Bush administration: the USA will not ratify the Kyoto 
protocol, but will carry out abatement efforts in its own interest. 
6 For singletons, the equality between regional MAC and regional MB holds for samples where marginal benefits are 
nonnegative, but not necessarily for the mean values. Similarly, regional MAC equals coalitional MB for coalition 
members only at the level of individual samples with nonnegative marginal benefits. 
  13The last column in Table 5 shows the mean incentive to change membership: for 
example, if the USA were to join the coalition of Japan and European Union, it’s mean 
payoff would be reduced by 247 bln $. Similarly, Japan and European Union would 
have a lower payoff of 79 and 12 bln $, respectively, if they were to leave the coalition. 
It turns out that the mean values for the incentive to change membership are negative 
for all regions. Thus, a model that only looks at mean values would come to the 
conclusion that this coalition is both internally and externally stable. But the 
corresponding SL is only 24%, implying that in three quarter of all samples the coalition 
is unstable. This clearly illustrates the importance of using a more sophisticated stability 
indicator, such as SL, when the probability density functions of the model parameters 
are strongly skewed.  
The relationship between the samples of global marginal benefits and the corresponding 
global abatement levels is illustrated in Figure 1 for the All-Singletons structure. For 
samples with negative marginal benefits, optimal abatement levels are zero. For positive 
marginal benefits, there is a clear positive correlation between the marginal benefits and 
abatement levels, but the relation is not linear: as marginal abatement costs increase 
quadratic in abatement levels, higher marginal benefits lead to a less than proportional 






































































Figure 1. Relationship between global marginal benefits and global abatement levels for 
the All-Singletons structure. 
 
  14The graph clearly shows the dispersion in global marginal benefits that is generated by 
the distribution function and the resulting dispersion in optimal global abatement levels. 
The bulk of samples produce global marginal benefits between 0 and 200 $/ton, with 
corresponding optimal abatement levels of less than 200 Gton over the century, though 
outliers may have a value of more than 800 $/ton for marginal benefits, while abatement 
levels can be up to 400 Gton. 
As we may recall, stability of a coalition structure comprises internal and external 
stability. The internal SL, i.e. the Stability Likelihood when considering only internal 
stability, of the coalition between Japan and the European Union is somewhat larger 
than the ‘total’ SL (0.33 vs. 0.24), as shown in Table 6.
7 This implies that in some 
samples, the coalition structure is internally stable, but one or more other regions wish 
to join this coalition, making it externally unstable. For most samples (67 %), however, 
this coalition structure is not internally stable.  
Table 6. Internal stability likelihood (ISL) and SL of selected coalition structures. 
Coalition ISL  SL  Coalition ISL  SL 
JPN,EEC  0.33 0.24  FSU,CHN  0.22 0.09 
USA,EEC  0.33 0.14  OOE,EET  0.22 0.09 
OOE,EEX  0.29 0.09  EET,EEX  0.22 0.09 
OOE,FSU  0.28 0.09  USA,OOE  0.20 0.09 
OOE,CHN  0.28 0.09  EET,FSU  0.19 0.10 
USA,JPN  0.27 0.15  EEC,FSU  0.19 0.09 
EEX,CHN  0.24 0.09  OOE,DAE  0.19 0.09 
EET,CHN  0.24 0.09  OOE,IND  0.18 0.09 
FSU,EEX  0.23 0.09  OOE,ROW  0.18 0.09 
USA,FSU  0.23 0.10  Grand  coalition  0.09 0.09 
 
In the vast majority of the coalition structures, including all coalition structures with 4 
coalition members or more, there is at least one region that wishes to leave the coalition 
and ISL equals SL. Thus, internal stability can be identified as the main problem in 
achieving larger and more ambitious coalitions.
8 
                                                 
7 Note that the singleton coalition structures are internally stable by definition; hence, their ISL equals unity. 
8 Many large coalitions have an external SL of almost 1; the external SL of coalition {JPN,EEC} equals 0.64. 
  154.2.   Results for the alternative specification with lower mean global benefits 
It is clear that the probability density function used for global marginal benefits is of 
crucial importance for the results of the analysis. Moreover, estimates of future benefits 
from abatement are widely acknowledged to be highly uncertain. Therefore, we carry 
out an alternative simulation with a different assumption on the global benefit parameter 
γ. Table 7 shows results assuming that the 5 percentile point is set to 0 $/ton and the 95 
percentile point is set to 110 $/ton. This implies that extreme values are rare and that the 
mean value for global marginal benefits is reduced from 77 to 37 $/ton. This lower 
mean is in line with the value for global marginal benefits used in the deterministic 
setting in Finus et al. (2005). 
Table 7. Results for selected (non-trivial) coalition structures (mean values) using 










All-Singletons undefined  undefined  44.5  2520 
JPN,EEC 0.20 0.15 47.9 2660 
USA,JPN 0.11 0.06 51.2 2790 
USA,EEC  0.10 0.05 55.2 2929 
JPN,BRA 0.07 0.02 44.7 2532 
JPN,ROW  0.07 0.02 49.5 2774 
EEC,ROW  0.06 0.01 51.2 2844 
JPN,IND  0.06 0.01 50.3 2819 
EEC,BRA  0.06 0.01 45.0 2543 
JPN,FSU 0.06 0.01 49.1 2738 
EEC,IND 0.06 0.01 52.1 2894 
Grand coal.  0.05  0.00  225.8  8353 
 
For all coalition structures, the SL is lower than in the base specification. This is partly 
due to the lower probability of negative marginal benefits (this probability is reduced to 
5%) and partly due to the fact that mostly positive outliers of marginal benefits are 
removed from the model. The ranking (in terms of SL) of the different coalition 
structures is largely unchanged, implying that the level of global marginal benefits 
changes only the quantitative results, but not qualitative conclusions.  
  16The lower benefits clearly reduce optimal abatement levels. In the All-Singletons 
structure, global abatement levels drop from around 70 Gton per century to 45 Gton. It 
is obvious that the reduction in mean marginal benefits does not translate into a 
proportional reduction in mean abatement levels (cf. Figure 1). This is due to the non-
linear nature of the model: the quadratic marginal abatement cost functions imply that 
lower marginal benefits lead to less than proportionately lower abatement levels. The 
lower benefits and abatement levels also lead to lower pay-offs (2.5 trillion $ versus 
8.8 trillion $ in the base specification).  
These quantitative results for the alternative specification are roughly comparable to the 
results of the deterministic setting (cf. Finus et al., 2005). They found that none of the 
coalition structures is stable, but that the coalition of the European Union and Japan is 
stable when the global benefit level is raised by at least 20 percent. In the stochastic 
setting, this translates into an SL for this coalition structure that is higher than all others, 
but well below unity. 
4.3.   Results of the sensitivity analyses 
In order to shed light on the robustness of our previous conclusions, a series of 
sensitivity analyses have been carried out. The main results of alternative assumptions 
regarding the uncertainty of the main model parameters are reported in Table 8. A 
second set of sensitivity analyses concerns the functional forms used in the simulations, 
and is reported in Table 9. 





w.r.t.  i s  
No uncertainty 
w.r.t. γ  
No uncertainty 
w.r.t.  , ii α β  
JPN,EEC  0.24 0.63 0.17 0.24 
USA,JPN  0.15 0.09 0.07 0.15 
USA,EEC 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.14 
JPN,BRA  0.12 0.09 0.02 0.11 
JPN,ROW 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.11 
EEC,ROW 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.10 
JPN,IND  0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 
JPN,FSU  0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 
EEC,BRA 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 
EEC,FSU  0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 
Grand coal.  0.09  0.09  0  0.09 
  17The general result that emerges from these sensitivity analyses is that although the 
levels regional abatement levels and payoffs depend on several model parameters, the 
sensitivity of the value of SL is much smaller. Essentially, the value of SL depends 
crucially on two elements: (i) the variance in regional benefit shares ( i s ), and (ii) the 
variance and level of the global benefit level (γ ), but only through changes in the 
probability of negative benefits. Reducing the uncertainty with respect to the regional 
benefit shares from the model greatly reduces the variability of stability over the 
different coalitions. Thus, when regional benefit shares are known, it becomes much 
easier to predict which regions have incentives to collaborate and which don’t: only the 
coalition structure of Japan and European Union has an SL that is higher than the 
probability of indifference. 












, ii αβ  
i s ∑ varies 
from unity 
JPN,EEC  0.24 0.26 0.32 0.24 0.24 
USA,JPN  0.15 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.15 
USA,EEC  0.14 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.14 
JPN,BRA  0.12 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.11 
JPN,ROW  0.11 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.11 
EEC,ROW  0.11 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.11 
JPN,IND  0.10 0.06 0.20 0.10 0.10 
JPN,FSU  0.10 0.07 0.20 0.10 0.10 
EEC,BRA  0.10 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.10 
EEC,FSU  0.10 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.10 
Grand  coal. 0.09 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.09 
 
For the ranking of the different coalition structures in terms of their SL, we get an even 
stronger result: in all simulations, the same structures emerge as the most stable. In all 
cases the coalition of Japan and European Union has the highest SL, followed by USA 
and Japan and USA and European Union. Thus, we can conclude that SL provides a 
highly robust indicator of the stability of climate coalitions. 
Finally, the impact of rescaling regional benefits to sum to unity is investigated by 
removing this assumption from the model. Thus, global benefit levels vary not only 
  18with the variations in the global benefit parameter, but also with the sum of the regional 
shares. It turns out that this assumption is not of major significance: the results remain 
very similar to the base specification. 
 
5.   Discussion 
This paper investigates the formation and stability of coalitions on an international 
climate agreement. We introduce a methodology to calculate the stability of all possible 
coalition structures in a stochastic, empirical setting. The concept of Stability 
Likelihood (SL) provides a notion of stability that conveys much more relevant 
information than the ordinary binary outcome: stable / unstable. 
The numerical application shows that the SL concept contributes to a better 
understanding of stability of coalition structures under uncertainty. The results suggest 
that for most possible climate coalition structures there is at least one region that is 
better off by changing it’s actions, thereby making these structures unstable. This 
includes important coalition structures such as the coalition of industrialised countries 
and the Grand Coalition. The lack of stability holds for the wide range of possible 
values for regional abatement costs and benefits, as described by the respective 
probability distribution functions. Only when benefits from abatement are zero or 
negative (calibrated to be around 9 percent in the base specification), i.e. when climate 
change does not pose a problem, will regions be indifferent to signing an agreement. In 
such cases, the optimal abatement levels will be zero, regardless of coalition formation. 
Consequently, there is only a limited number of coalition structures with a SL larger 
than the probability of indifference. 
The non-trivial coalition structure with the highest SL is the coalition of Japan and the 
European Union, with an SL equal to 24 percent. This relatively low number stresses 
the difficulties in striking an international environmental agreement. In fact, the highest 
Stability Likelihood (40 percent) is achieved when Japan takes the initiative to 
participate in a small coalition, as none of the other regions is willing to join Japan. 
It is important to note that the coalition structures with relatively high SL hardly 
improve over the All-Singletons case: abatement efforts are only slightly higher than 
when there is no international collaboration at all. If coalition structures are stable, they 
are small and only marginally improve upon the All-Singletons case in terms of global 
welfare, global emissions and concentrations, confirming the results of the deterministic 
literature. 
The gains from co-operation that are at stake in the case of global warming are large 
according to our model. This is not only true for the absolute amount of global net 
benefits in the global optimum (Grand Coalition Structure), but also when this number 
is put in perspective to net benefits in the All-Singletons case. The conclusion can be 
  19drawn that additional mechanisms have to be included in the international negotiations 
to overcome the large free rider incentives; such additional mechanisms could take the 
form of a scheme for international transfers or issue linking. 
The calculated SL of the different coalition structures is robust in terms of the 
distribution functions used, the variance in regional abatement costs and the global level 
of benefits from global abatement, but sensitive to the variance in the regional 
distribution of benefits. Unfortunately, regional benefits from abatement are very 
uncertain, and international research on adaptation and damage costs is still in its 
infancy. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to get better information on this issue.  
There are many ways in which the analysis above can be ameliorated. First, better 
estimates of the variance on regional benefits may be obtained via a meta-analysis of the 
existing literature, similar to what Tol (2005) did for global benefits. Secondly, the 
empirical model used to calculate the regional payoffs can be extended to a fully-
fledged computable general equilibrium model. Together, these two extensions will 
improve the empirical validity of the numerical example. Thirdly, asymmetric 
information and learning may give more insight in the actual position of individual 
players in the international negotiations. Finally, the analysis can be extended to 
decision making under uncertainty, e.g. by using utility functions to describe risk-
aversion of players. Nonetheless, the current application already shows that many 
relevant results and interpretations can be obtained by investigating the Stability 
Likelihood of coalition structures. 
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  22Appendix I. Histograms for the uncertain model parameters 
 
 
Figure A.1. Histogram for the global benefit parameter (γ). 
 




Figure A.3. Histogram for the regional abatement cost parameter ( i α ) for USA and 
China, respectively. 
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